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The Shor-Preskill proof of the security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol relies on
the theoretical existence of good classical error-correcting codes with the “dual-containing” property.
A practical implementation of BB84 thus requires explicit and efficiently decodable constructions
of such codes, which are not known. On the other hand, modern coding theory abounds with non-
dual-containing codes with excellent performance and efficient decoding algorithms. We show that
the dual-containing constraint can be lifted at a small price: instead of a key distribution protocol,
an efficiently implementable key expansion protocol is obtained, capable of increasing the size of a
pre-shared key by a constant factor.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant
parties Alice and Bob to establish a secret key using one-
way quantum communication and public classical com-
munication. This key is provably secure from an all-
powerful eavesdropper Eve, who is allowed to intercept
the quantum communication, perform block processing
of quantum data, and listen to the public discussion. In
contrast, key distribution by public communication alone
is impossible. QKD owes its security to two facts: 1) Al-
ice and Bob, by performing tomography on their (quan-
tum) data, automatically obtain information about Eve’s
(quantum) data; 2) with this knowledge Alice and Bob
can perform information reconciliation (IR) and privacy
amplification (PA) to distill a key which is common to
both (by IR), and about which Eve knows next to nothing
(by PA). In this Letter we solve the practical question of
constructing efficiently implementable codes for IR and
PA.
The best known QKD protocol, BB84, was proposed
by Bennett and Brassard in [1]. BB84 is a simple
“prepare-and-measure” protocol which can be imple-
mented without a quantum computer or quantum mem-
ory. Alice encodes a random bit either in the Z basis
{|0〉, |1〉} or X basis {|+〉, |−〉} [here |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)]
of a qubit system, and sends it to Bob. Bob performs
a measurement in one of the two bases, chosen at ran-
dom. After repeating this many times, they determine
by public discussion which bits they chose the same basis
for, thus establishing a raw key. They perform channel
estimation on a small fraction of the raw key bits. If the
channel is too noisy, they abort the protocol. Otherwise
they perform IR and PA on the remaining raw key bits
to obtain the final secret key.
Shor and Preskill [2] gave the first simple proof of the
security of standard BB84, by relating the IR and PA
steps to Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error
correcting codes. A CSS code protects m qubits from
errors by “rotating” them into a 2m dimensional subspace
of an n qubit system. This subspace is the simultaneous
eigenspace of “stabilizer” operators of the form
Zh = Zh(1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zh(n),
Xg = Xg(1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Xg(n).
Here Z and X are Pauli matrices, and h = h(1) . . . h(n)
and g = g(1) . . . g(n) are binary vectors of length n. The
vectors h are g are chosen to be rows of the classical “par-
ity check” matrices H1 and H2, respectively. To ensure
that the stabilizer operators commute, H1 and H2 must
be mutually orthogonal: H1H
T
2 = 0. This condition is
equivalent to saying that the codes corresponding to H1
and H2 contain each other’s duals. Let the (n− ki)× n
parity check matrix Hi correspond to an [n, ki, d] clas-
sical error correcting code which encodes ki bits into n
bits and corrects errors on any t = (d− 1)/2 bits. Then
m = k1 + k2 − n and the CSS code corrects quantum
errors on any t qubits.
In order to securely implement the BB84 protocol we
need to find good mutually dual containing codes of large
blocklength n. These are known to exist in principle, by
the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for CSS codes [3]. Unfor-
tunately, no explicit constructions are known, let alone
ones that would be simple to decode. Our main result
is that the dual-containing condition may be lifted. This
permits us to employ excellent efficiently decodable mod-
ern classical codes such as LDPC [4] and turbo codes [5].
The price we have to pay is that our protocol performs ex-
pansion of a pre-shared key rather than creating one from
scratch. This is not much of a drawback, as existing QKD
protocols require a logarithmic amount of pre-shared key
to authenticate the public discussion. Still we choose to
make this distinction, as in our case the pre-shared key
is linear in the quantum communication cost. Our con-
struction is closely related to the entanglement-assisted
quantum codes of Brun, Devetak and Hsieh [6], which
generalize stabilizer codes to the communication setting
where the sender and receiver have access to pre-shared
entanglement.
First we consider an idealized setting in which the
eavesdropper is known to have introduced errors on no
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FIG. 1: The construction of the full rank matrices N1 and
N2.
more than a fixed fraction of the qubits. In other
words, the channel estimation is assumed to have been
successfully performed. We show how to construct an
[n,m − c, d; c] quantum key expansion (QKE) protocol,
which expands the key from c to m bits if at most
t = (d − 1)/2 out of n qubits have become corrupted.
Then we invoke standard results [2, 7, 8] to incorporate
the channel estimation phase.
Let Hi (i = 1, 2) be the parity check matrix for a clas-
sical [n, ki, d] code Ci ⊂ Zn2 , so that the rows of Hi form
a basis for C⊥i . Consider the (n− k1)× (n− k2) matrix
M = H1H
T
2 . In general M 6= 0 and it can be row and
column reduced (i.e. multiplied from the left and right
by non-singular transformation matrices T1 and T
T
2 ) to
a matrix of the form
T1MT
T
2 =
(
0ℓ1×ℓ2 0ℓ1×c
0c×ℓ2 Ic
)
= J1J
T
2 ,
where n− k1 = c+ ℓ1 and n− k2 = c+ ℓ2 and
Ji =
(
0ℓi×c
Ic
)
.
This is the well known Gaussian elimination procedure.
Letting H˜i = TiHi be an equivalent parity matrix for the
code Ci, we have H˜1H˜
T
2 = J1J
T
2 . Hence H
′
1H
′T
2 = 0,
where the (n − ki) × (n + c) “augmented” parity check
matrices H ′i (cf. [6]) are given by H
′
i = (H˜i Ji). Note
that H ′i can be viewed as the parity check matrix of a
classical code C′i by defining the row space of H
′
i to be
C
′⊥
i . Then C
′⊥
2 ⊆ C′1 and C
′⊥
1 ⊆ C′2. The set of errors
H ′i can correct is the same as the set of errors Hi can
correct, assuming that the last c bits are error free. Thus
H ′i can correct the error set S(n, c, d) defined as the set
of binary row vectors of dimension n+c with ≤ (d−1)/2
ones among the first n bits, and zeros elsewhere.
To relate the error correcting properties of these classi-
cal codes to those of the corresponding CSS codes, we find
it useful to extend the parity check matrices H ′1 and H
′
2
to full rank matrices as shown in Figure 1. Starting with
H ′1, whose rows are a basis for C
′⊥
1 , addm = k1+k2+c−n
independent row vectors (comprising the matrix E1) such
that the rows of H ′1 and E1 together form a basis for
C′2 ⊇ C
′⊥
1 . Collect the remaining n − k2 independent
vectors in the matrix F1. The (n+ c)× (n+ c) matrix
N1 =
H
′
1
E1
F1

has full rank, and hence so does N1N
T
1 . By Gaus-
sian elimination, there exists a matrix T such that
N1N
T
1 T
T = I. Decompose N2 = TN1 into three seg-
ments just like N1:
N2 =
F2E2
Hˆ2
 .
The condition N1N
T
2 = I is now written as
H ′1F
T
2 = I, H
′
1E
T
2 = 0, H
′
1Hˆ
T
2 = 0,
E1F
T
2 = 0, E1E
T
2 = I, E1Hˆ
T
2 = 0, (1)
F1F
T
2 = 0, F1E
T
2 = 0, F1Hˆ
T
2 = I.
Hence the rows of Hˆ2 form a basis for C
′⊥
2 . With an
appropriate redefinition of F1 we can identify Hˆ2 with
H ′2. H
′
2 and E2 together form a basis for C
′
1 ⊇ C
′⊥
2 .
An error set E1 ⊂ Zn+c2 correctable by the code H ′1 is
of the form
E1 = {bF2 + β(b)E2 + β′(b)H ′2 : b ∈ Zn−k12 },
where β : Zn−k12 → Zm2 and β′ : Zn−k12 → Zn−k22 are
known functions. Thus β(b) is a row vector of dimension
m and β(b)E2 is an element of the row space of E2. b is
called the error syndrome since it uniquely specifies the
error. For an error u ∈ E1, by (1), the error syndrome is
calculated as b = H ′1u
T . Since H1 is an [n, k1, d] code,
S(n, c, d) ⊆ E1.
Similarly, an error set E2 ⊂ Zn+c2 correctable by the
code H ′2 is of the form
E2 = {pF1 + α(p)E1 + α′(p)H ′1 : p ∈ Zn−k22 },
where α : Zn−k22 → Zm2 and α′ : Zn−k22 → Zn−k12
are known functions. Since H2 is an [n, k2, d] code,
S(n, c, d) ⊆ E2.
In the Shor-Preskill proof [2] a QKD protocol was ob-
tained by modifying an entanglement distillation proto-
col. Our starting point is an entanglement assisted en-
tanglement distillation (EAED) protocol. Alice and Bob
initially share the state |Φ〉⊗c, where
|Φ〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B)
is the ebit state.
3Their goal is to distill a total of m ebits. The resources
at their disposal are classical communication and a noisy
n-qubit channel, which introduces errors on at most t
out of n qubits. At the beginning of the protocol, Alice
creates another n ebit states locally and sends the B part
of them through the noisy channel to Bob. An operator
written as U ⊗ V means that U acts on “subsystem A”,
the n + c qubits that stay with Alice, and V acts on
“subsystem B”, the n+ c qubits which end up in Bob’s
possession. We will describe the noise more generally
as acting on the latter n + c qubits (even though only
the first n of these are affected): let Q(n, c, d) be the
set of error operators of the form I ⊗ (Xh1Zh2) where
h1, h2 ∈ S(n, c, d). TheX-type errors are called bit errors
and the Z-type errors are called phase errors. Because
S(n, c, d) ⊆ E1 ∩ E2, every element of Q(n, c, d) is of the
form
I ⊗ (ZpF1XbF2Zα(p)E1Zα′(p)H′1Xβ(b)E2Xβ′(b)H′2), (2)
for some p ∈ Zn−k12 , b ∈ Zn−k22 .
Our EAED protocol comprises the following steps:
1. The initial state is |Φ〉⊗n+c. The first n ebits
are held entirely by Alice, and the last c are
shared between Alice and Bob. Denote by 0 the
[(n + c)-dimensional] all-zero vector. The state
|Φ〉⊗n+c is the simultaneous (−1)(0,0) eigenstate of
{ZIn+c ⊗ZIn+c , XIn+c ⊗XIn+c}. By this we mean
that it is the (−1)0 = 1 eigenstate of Ze ⊗ Ze for
each row e of the (n+ c)× (n+ c) identity matrix
In+c. As the matrices N1 and N2 are full rank, this
state is equivalently described as the simultaneous
(−1)(0,0;0,0;0,0) eigenstate of the operators
{ZH′1 ⊗ ZH′1 , XF2 ⊗XF2 ;
ZE1 ⊗ ZE1, XE2 ⊗XE2 ; (3)
ZF1 ⊗ ZF1 , XH′2 ⊗XH′2}.
In other words, it is the (−1)0 eigenstate of Zh1 ⊗
Zh1 for each row h1 of H
′
1, etc.
2. An error in Q(n, c, d) of the form (2) oc-
curs. The new state is the simultaneous
(−1)(b,α′(p);β(b),α(p);β′(b),p) eigenstate of the opera-
tors in (3). This is easily seen from the relations (1)
and the fact that acting with (I ⊗Xg) on a eigen-
state of (Zh ⊗ Zh) with eigenvalue (−1)a, changes
the eigenvalue to (−1)a+ghT [and similarly with X
and Z interchanged].
3. In order to find out the error syndromes b and
p, Alice and Bob should measure the commuting
operators {ZH′1 ⊗ ZH′1 , XH′2 ⊗ XH′2}. However,
this would require a non-local measurement. Since
Zh⊗Zh = (Zh⊗I)(I⊗Zh), Alice and Bob can effec-
tively measure Zh⊗Zh by Alice measuring Zh⊗ I,
Bob measuring I⊗Zh and multiplying the measure-
ment outcomes. Thus, Alice measures ZH
′
1 ⊗ I and
XH
′
2 ⊗ I, obtaining b′ and p′, and Bob measures
I ⊗ ZH′1 and I ⊗ XH′2 , obtaining b′′ and p′′. Al-
ice sends Bob her measurement outcomes and Bob
computes p = p′ + p′′ and b = b′ + b′′.
4. Bob performs the correction operation I ⊗
(Zα(p)E1Xβ(b)E2). Alice and Bob are left with
the simultaneous (−1)(0,0) eigenstate of {ZE1 ⊗
ZE1 , XE2 ⊗ XE2}. They can transform this state
by local unitaries into |Φ〉⊗m.
This EAED protocol is readily made into an
entanglement-assisted secret key distillation protocol.
Starting with the distilled state |Φ〉⊗m, Alice measures
ZIm ⊗ I and Bob measures I ⊗ZIm to obtain a common
key k ∈ Zm2 . The key is decoupled from the rest of the
world, and hence Eve, because |Φ〉⊗m is a pure state.
We proceed to simplify this key distillation protocol.
Instead of transforming into |Φ〉⊗m in step 4, and mea-
suring {ZIm ⊗ I, I⊗ZIm}, it suffices to measure ZE1 ⊗ I
and I⊗ZE1 to obtain k directly. In step 4, Bob need not
perform the phase error part I⊗Zα(p)E1 of the correction
operation; this commutes with the ZE1 ⊗ I and I ⊗ZE1
operators, and hence does not affect the measured key
value k. Thus measuring XH
′
2 ⊗ I and I ⊗XH′2 in step 3
is also unnecessary. Bob performing the bit error correc-
tion I ⊗Xβ(b)E2, followed by measuring I ⊗ ZE1 to get
k, is equivalent to just measuring I ⊗ ZE1 to get k′ and
computing k = k′ + β(b).
The new key distillation protocol consists of steps 1
and 2, followed by:
3. Alice measures ZH
′
1⊗I, obtaining b′, and Bob mea-
sures I ⊗ZH′1 , obtaining b′′. Alice sends b′ to Bob.
4. Alice measures ZE1 ⊗ I, obtaining k, and Bob
measures I ⊗ ZE1 , obtaining k′. Bob computes
k = k′ + β(b′ + b′′).
The above protocol requires multi-qubit operations
and pre-shared entanglement. We will now reduce it to
single-qubit operations and replace the entanglement by
a pre-shared secret key.
As they commute with all the other steps, Alice may
perform her ZH
′
1 ⊗ I and ZE1 ⊗ I measurements before
step 2. For the same reason she can measure ZF1 ⊗ I
at the same time. Together, these three measurements
are equivalent to Alice measuring the Z operator of each
individual qubit, obtaining a string u ∈ Zn+c2 . Then
b′ = H ′1u
T and k = E1u
T .
Bob can measure I⊗ZF1 at the end of the protocol, as
it commutes with I ⊗ZH′1 and I ⊗ZE1 . Together, these
three measurements are equivalent to Bob measuring the
Z operator of each individual qubit. The measurement
result v ∈ Zn+c2 is used to compute b′′ = H ′1vT and k′ =
E1v
T .
4Because Bob has the last c qubits from the beginning
(equivalently, the noise acts as the identity on them), he
can measure them at the same time as Alice. Alice and
Bob performing local Z measurements on the last c ebits
is as if they shared a secret key κ of length c bits to
start with. Alice measuring half of an ebit |Φ〉 in the
Z basis and sending the other half through the channel
is equivalent to her preparing |0〉 or |1〉 at random and
sending it through the channel. This leaves us with the
[n, k1 + k2 − n, d; c] QKE protocol below.
1. Alice and Bob share a secret key κ of length c bits.
Alice generates a random n bit string r. Together
they form the n + c bit string u = (r, κ). Alice
computes b′ = H ′1u
T and k = E1u
T .
2. Alice prepares the product state |r〉 in her lab and
sends it over the noisy channel.
3. Bob receives the corrupted n qubit state. He mea-
sures each qubit in the Z basis, obtaining a string
r′, which together with Bob’s copy of the initial se-
cret key κ forms the n + c bit string v = (r′, κ).
Bob computes b′′ = H ′1v
T and k′ = E1vT .
4. Alice sends b′ to Bob. Bob computes k = k′+β(b′+
b′′).
The above QKE protocol deals with the unrealistic sit-
uation in which Eve is known to have introduced no more
than t errors. To deal with the most general eavesdrop-
ping attack, the so-called coherent attack, Alice and Bob
need to be able to estimate the effective channel intro-
duced by Eve. It was shown in [8] that there is no loss of
generality in assuming that Eve effects a Pauli channel,
i.e. one that applies elements of the Pauli group chosen
with particular probabilities. However, preparing and
measuring only in the Z basis is insufficient to estimate
the channel; for instance, phase errors pass undetected.
The BB84 protocol circumvents this problem by prepar-
ing and measuring in both the Z and X bases. Alice
will have to send a total of (2 + 3δ)n qubits: the factor
of 2 comes from number of different bases used and a
small fraction δn is reserved for channel estimation. The
details of the protocol follow:
1. Alice creates (2 + 3δ)n random bits.
2. Alice chooses a random (2+3δ)n-bit string a, which
determines whether the corresponding bit of r is to be
prepared in the Z (if the corresponding bit of a is 0) or
X basis (if the bit of a is 1).
3. Alice sends the qubits to Bob.
4. Bob receives the (2+3δ)n qubits and measures each
in the Z or X basis at random.
5. Alice announces a.
6. Bob discards any results where he measured a differ-
ent basis than Alice prepared in. With high probability,
there are at least (1+ δ)n bits left (if not, abort the pro-
tocol). Alice randomly chooses a set of n bits to be her
string r, and Bob’s corresponding bits comprise r′. The
remaining nδ bits are used for channel estimation.
7. Alice and Bob publicly announce the values of their
channel estimation bits. If the estimated channel intro-
duces more than t errors, they abort the protocol.
8. Alice computes b′ = H ′1u
T and k = E1u
T , where
u = (r, κ). Alice announces b′.
9. Bob computes b′′ = H ′1v
T and k′ = E1vT , where
v = (r′, κ). Bob’s estimate of the key k is k′+β(b′+ b′′).
Observe that if the protocol fails at any point, the pre-
shared key κ remains uncompromised. Since the protocol
was obtained from an entanglement distillation protocol,
it is also universally composable [9].
As in [2, 8], we can go beyond fixed-distance codes,
and instead use codes which merely perform well on i.i.d.
(independent, identically distributed) channels. This is
achieved by Alice performing a random permutation on
her bits, and announcing it to Bob in step 5, thus sym-
metrizing the noisy channel induced by Eve’s actions. If
Alice and Bob estimate a rate q of X and Z errors, it
suffices for C1 and C2 to perform well on a binary sym-
metric channel (BSC) with error parameter slightly above
q [8]. Modern classical codes such as turbo codes [5] and
LDPC codes [4] can essentially achieve the Shannon ca-
pacity 1 − H(q) on a BSC. Moreover, these codes are
(suboptimally) decodable in polynomial time. This gives
a key rate of (m− c)/n ≈ 2(1−H(q)) − 1 = 1 − 2H(q),
which hits 0 for q = 0.11. Thus, with a QKE protocol
based on modern codes we can tolerate the Shor-Preskill
bound q = 0.11 in practice.
At present there is a large gap between abstract se-
curity proofs of QKD, which rely on the theoretical ex-
istence of certain codes, and experimental implementa-
tions, which use PA and IR codes chosen ad hoc and are
thus not proven to be secure. Our result bridges this
gap: it makes accessible the example of modern turbo
and LDPC codes which are readily available, easy to en-
code and decode, yet provide a basis for unconditionally
secure key distribution protocols. The performance of
specific modern codes is currently under investigation.
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